Yeoman 3-Rights Value JAPAN Fund VCC^

At 30 Jun 2026
NAV/Share:
S$237.34

Performance: 9 years 7 months ending 30 June 2026

Period	Performance (SGD)
CAGR (per annum)	**+9.44%**
Cumulative Performance	**+137.34%**
June 2026	**+0.27%**
Year To Date 2026	**+6.54%**
Historical Performance	
2025	35.54%
2024	6.67%
2023	28.20%
2022	-9.15%
2021	3.80%
2020	-4.72%
2019	15.51%
2018	-13.14%
2017	30.77%
2016*	1.96%

Portfolio Valuations (trailing)	
PE	9.59x
P/B	0.64x
Dividend Yield	3.27%
ROE (1-yr)	6.67%
ROE (5-yr ave)	6.28%
Weighted Ave Mkt Cap	S$236.61m

Equities/Cash Allocations	
Equities	90.55%
Cash & current assets	9.45%

Note: In Singapore dollar terms, dividends re-invested. Net of fees.
** 2016 performance is from end November to end December.*



** Chart shows performance from 30 November 2016, re-based to 100. Performance in SGD. Dividends re-invested. Net of fees.*

General Information

Yeoman 3-Rights Value Japan Fund VCC
(UEN: T22VC0008D)
c/o Yeoman Capital Management Pte Ltd
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Seng Kee Building
Singapore 239070

Manager:
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Website: www.yeomancap.com

Total Value of Fund:
S$38,329,286.35

Total Number of Shares:
161,458.976

Management Fee:
1% p.a.

Performance Fee:
15% High Water Mark

Subscription Frequency:
Monthly

Redemption Frequency:
Quarterly

Investment Horizon:
3-5 years or more

Early Exit Charges:
In 1st Year: **5.0%**
In 2nd Year: **2.5%**
In 3rd Year: **1.25%**
(Payable to Fund)

Minimum Initial Investment:
S$125,000

Minimum Top-up Subscription:
S$25,000

Custodian:
Portcullis Trust (Singapore) Ltd, Deutsche Bank

Auditor:
Crowe Horwath First Trust LLP

Performance Summary for June 2026

In June, our Fund was up **0.27%**

Year to date our Fund is up **6.54%**

Since inception on 1 December 2016, our Fund is up a cumulative **137.34%**; on annualized terms the Fund is up **+9.44% p.a.** *nett of all fees with dividends reinvested in SGD terms*.

Manager Discussion and Review at end 2Q26

In our past newsletters, we wrote about the ongoing revisions to Japan's Corporate Governance Code, which is expected to be finalized later this year. The current draft includes a clause pushing companies to put idle cash to work and to issue their annual securities reports 3 weeks before the scheduled AGMs. Such advance notice, already standard in many developed markets but new in Japan, is meant to give shareholders time to study the reports before they attend the Meetings. This means that, henceforth, listed companies will be watched more effectively by two sets of eyes – the authorities and shareholders.

While the code still works on a "comply or explain" basis and is not a legal requirement, Japanese corporate culture has changed since the Tokyo Stock Exchange began pressing companies from early 2023 to improve capital efficiency and to lift stock prices that had been languishing below book value.

In parallel, shareholders started applying pressure on management to make share buybacks and increase dividend pay-outs. This conversation is likely to continue for the AGM season this year as capital allocation is now a top topic in discussions between companies and shareholders as well as between companies and the Exchange.

We see examples of this swell of activity in the companies we own. In one case, an overseas activist investor which owns a 6% stake in a company that manufactures car rear view mirrors, including camera-based and sensor-equipped mirror systems, tabled 4 proposals for the company's AGM in June. These proposals called for share buybacks, a majority of independent board members, performance-linked executive pay and a change to the timetable leading up to the Meeting so that shareholders would have the annual securities report in hand with sufficient time to study it before attending the meeting. While the proposals were voted down, the two longest-serving independent directors were re-elected with 88% support, compared with 98% support for the rest of the board. This gap likely reflects investor unease about board independence, the very issue the activist had raised. On a positive note, the company also lifted its dividend payout ratio from under 18% to about 46% over recent years. It is encouraging to see that external pressure, whether from the Exchange, business peers or shareholders, can help shift a listed company's attitudes and behaviour over time.

In June 2026, our Fund accepted a tender offer for one of its holdings called Tohoku Steel. The offeror was the majority shareholder Daido Steel, which offered to acquire all outstanding shares which it did not already own. Tohoku Steel's main business is in manufacturing specialty steel products with end-customers largely in the automotive sector. The offer price was **+86%** above the market closing price before the announcement as well as +**144%** above the average cost paid by the Fund since inception in November 2016 and **+342%** above the average cost when the position was held in the predecessor mandate (from March 2011 to October 2016) that became the Fund, excluding dividends. More details of this case will be included in the Annual Report of our Japan Fund later this year. We first bought the shares of Tohoku Steel in 2011 in the aftermath of the Fukushima earthquake and tsunami which was 15 years ago. Our investment team had a phone call with the company management to make sure that the factory was not damaged by the quake or flooded by the tsunami waves. The phone call was part of our due diligence on the stock which, in hindsight, has done well for us.

With each such case, we are reminded that patient capital is rewarded when market price rises to meet value, assessed much earlier by our team. To use an analogy, consider a football club that signs undervalued players and sells them once the market catches up, then does it again and again. The squad grows more valuable over the years, but this football club does not change its formula, i.e. it is still buying every new player cheaply. At Yeoman, we work the same way. The NAV per share of our Fund has risen over the years of applying this investment discipline. Even so, what tells you that our holdings today are still cheap is the P/B or price-to-book ratio which is currently **0.64x**. This means we own and hold these businesses for well below what their own balance sheet net assets are worth.

While the recent corporate reforms in Japan are a welcome tailwind, even without that our strategy will not change. We will stick to our formula. We wrote about gold mining in our May report so you may also compare us to a dedicated and disciplined miner panning or digging for the valuable mineral day in, day out, even when there is no Gold Fever and the crowds are not there. In fact, it is often better when there isn't a Gold Rush and there are no crowds as it is much easier for us to find undervalued situations when there is no competition.

Eng Keong TAN
Assistant Portfolio Manager

APPENDIX – for information only

Japan Strategies performance data

Performance: 15 years 4 months ending 30 June 2026

Period	Japan Strategies (JPY terms)
CAGR (per annum)	**16.60%**
Cumulative Performance	**953.34%**
June 2026	**0.98%**
Year To Date 2026	**9.94%**
Historical Performance	
2025	43.10%
2024	15.07%
2023	40.06%
2022	4.46%
2021	13.26%
2020	-7.95%
2019	15.54%
2018	-16.80%
2017	36.50%
2016	7.08%
2015	10.20%
2014	23.57%
2013	61.59%
2012	18.20%
2011*	4.40%

Note: In JPY terms, dividends re-invested.
**** 2011 performance is from end February to end December.***
Gross of fees up to 30 November 2016; Net of fees from 1 December 2016



Data Source: Yeoman Capital Management Pte Ltd.
** Chart shows performance from 28 February 2011, re-based to 100. Performance in JPY, dividends reinvested, net of fees from 1 December 2016 fund inception onwards. Performance in JPY, dividends reinvested, gross of fees prior to 1 December 2016 refers to Yeoman Value Japan Fund (comparable investment objective), which was incepted on 1 March 2011.*